The advent of the religious right-wing as a formidable political force in Pakistan seems to be an outcome of direct and indirect patronage of the dominant military over the years. Ever since the creation of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, the military establishment has formed a quasi-alliance with the conservative religious elements who define a strongly Islamic identity for the country. The alliance has provided Islamism with regional perspectives and encouraged it to take advantage of the concept of jihad. This trend found its most blatant manifestation through the Afghan War. Thanks to the centrality of Islam in Pakistan’s national identity, secular leaders and groups find it extremely difficult to make a national consensus against groups that describe themselves as soldiers of Islam. Using two case studies, the article argues that the political survival of both the military and therefore the radical Islamist parties is predicated on their tacit understanding. It contends that without the de-radicalization of jihadis, the efforts to ‘mainstream’ them through the electoral process have huge implications for Pakistan’s political system also for prospects of regional peace.